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The conventional view that faster wage
growth would improve Social Security’s financial
condition rests on several measures of the pro-
gram’s finances that the Social Security trustees
emphasize in their annual reports. These mea-
sures include annual cash-balance ratios, the 75-
year actuarial deficit, the “crossover date,” and
the “trust fund–exhaustion date.” All of these
measures show that Social Security’s financial
condition would improve if future wage growth
were faster. This conventional view also suggests
that the trustees’ relatively conservative assump-
tions about future wage growth cause the pro-
gram’s financial imbalance to be overstated. 
Unfortunately, the measures highlighted in
the trustees’ annual reports have a short-term
orientation that biases calculations toward
showing an improvement under faster wage
growth. The connection between wage growth
and Social Security’s finances should be evaluat-
ed using measures that are free of a short-term
bias. This Policy Analysis evaluates the connec-
tion under the more comprehensive infinite-
horizon “fiscal imbalance” measure. It uses sim-
ple cases of the program’s operation to explore
the impact of the relevant forces—population
aging, wage growth, discount rates, and the pro-
jection horizon. It shows that although faster
wage growth is desirable in and of itself to
increase general prosperity, it would likely wors-
en Social Security’s overall financial condition.
By implication, a “do nothing” policy motivated
under the conventional view would be diametri-
cally opposed to the correct perspective: Early
reforms of Social Security should receive higher
priority under faster wage growth. 
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Introduction
The widely held view that faster “econom-
ic growth” would improve Social Security’s
finances is driven by the particular way in
which Social Security’s finances are mea-
sured. The Social Security Administration
and the program’s trustees provide several
measures of Social Security’s finances:
Annual cash-balance ratios, the 75-year actu-
arial deficit, the dates when various events are
projected to occur—such as the crossover date
and the trust fund exhaustion date—and so on
(see Box 1). Each of these measures indicates
that faster economic growth—faster wage
growth in particular—would improve the sys-
tem’s financing. More specifically, they sug-
gest that faster wage growth would lead to
smaller annual cash-balance ratios and a
smaller 75-year actuarial deficit. Moreover,
the crossover date and the trust fund exhaustion
date would both be shifted further into the
future under faster wage growth. 
A majority of analysts on both the left and
the right have embraced this result as gospel
truth and use it to support their preferred poli-
cies. Liberals, who favor maintaining the status
quo on Social Security, point to the post-1995
surge in worker productivity to suggest that the
Social Security Administration’s productivity
and wage-growth assumptions are too conserv-
ative. Those assumptions, it is claimed, cause
Social Security’s financial problem to be over-
stated. Their belief in the likely persistence of
the recent surge in labor productivity and wage
growth leads naturally to the policy recommen-
dation that there is no need to adjust Social
Security’s tax and benefit rules to reduce its offi-
cially reported imbalance. Rather, the correct
policy is to “do nothing.” Conservatives use the
conventional view—that faster wage growth
would improve Social Security’s finances—to
argue against growth-retarding policies, argu-
ing that taxes should indeed be cut and kept
low to promote economic growth.1
Unfortunately, the battery of measures
emphasized by the Social Security Administra-
tion suffers from a short-term orientation.2
That orientation biases the measures toward
generating the conventional view that faster
growth would improve Social Security’s fi-
nances. Each measure overemphasizes the pos-
itive impact of faster wage growth on the pro-
gram’s near-term revenues and de-emphasizes
the, again positive, impact on future benefits.
Faster wage growth increases the program’s
revenues immediately. Because benefits are
based on past wages, however, faster wage
growth beginning today would cause benefits
to increase only after a time lag. Therefore, a
short-horizon measure generally overstates the
salutary impact of faster wage growth on
Social Security’s finances.
The theoretically proper way to analyze
this issue is by adopting a comprehensive
measure of Social Security’s financial condi-
tion—by counting the impact of faster wage
growth on all future revenues and expendi-
tures—that is, by measuring them in perpetu-
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Box 1
Standard Measures of Social Security’s Financial Condition
Annual cash-balance ratios are the program’s annual cash flow surpluses—tax revenues
minus expenditures—as ratios to annual payrolls. The actuarial deficit refers to the negative
of present value of Social Security’s future unfunded obligations—the value of the trust
fund plus the discounted value of tax revenues and minus the discounted value of expen-
ditures—as a ratio to the present value of payrolls or GDP calculated over 75 years. The
crossover date refers to the year when the program’s expenditures begin to exceed its tax rev-
enues, currently projected to be 2017. The trust fund exhaustion date refers to the year when
the program’s trust fund is projected to be fully depleted, currently projected to occur in
2042.
ity. Social Security’s infinite-horizon actuarial
balance ratio (ABh) provides such a measure.
This is none other than the actuarial deficit
described earlier, except that the calculation is
not restricted to the next 75 years (called
AB75) but is extended through perpetuity. 
The short-horizon bias in Social Security
Administration’s battery of measures is not
the only reason that the conventional view
turns out to be mistaken in the U.S context.
Also relevant but rarely considered is the
interaction of the rate of population aging
with faster wage growth in determining
whether the latter would improve or worsen
Social Security’s financial condition. Indeed,
a careful analysis based on the ABhmeasure
reveals that the impact of faster wage growth
on Social Security’s financing is theoretically
ambiguous. 
This Policy Analysis describes the various
channels whereby faster wage growth influ-
ences Social Security’s finances. Because the
outcome is theoretically ambiguous, the
actual impact depends on the particular
demographic and economic parameters that
are in play. This Policy Analysis also analyzes
the impact of faster wage growth on Social
Security’s financial condition—as measured
by ABh—under calculations tailored to
reflect U.S. demographic and economic con-
ditions. Those calculations show, contrary to
the conventional view, that faster wage
growth would worsen Social Security’s finan-
cial condition as measured by ABh.
The Relevant Dimensions of 
“Economic Growth”
Although public discussion of this issue is
conducted in terms of the impact of “eco-
nomic growth” on Social Security’s finances,
the key factors are labor-productivity growth
and wage growth. Labor productivity growth
—the increase in the amount of output per
worker—is the font of economic prosperity,
increasing living standards and promoting
economic freedom. The faster that labor pro-
ductivity grows, the quicker the entire popu-
lation can enjoy more goods and services—
provided, of course, that total work effort in
the economy does not decline as productivity
increases. 
Measuring productivity growth over short
periods of time is hazardous because of its
volatility. Hence, most economists consider
decades-long averages of productivity growth
to draw conclusions about changes in its aver-
age rate of growth. The record of labor pro-
ductivity since the mid-1990s has been quite
encouraging. U.S. labor productivity grew at
an annual average rate of 2.6 percent per
year—almost twice as high compared to its
average during 1974–95 (1.4 percent per year)
and almost as fast as that achieved during the
postwar “high-growth” era of 1947–73 (2.8
percent per year).  
Those engaged in the Social Security
reform debate are particularly glad about the
pickup in the trend rate of productivity
growth after 1995. To be sure, both productiv-
ity and compensation growth are volatile and
do not move together over short periods of
time. However, the data clearly support the
hypothesis that long-term averages of workers’
compensation and productivity are positively
correlated—as is apparent from Figure 1.3
For Social Security, faster wage growth
means immediately higher payroll-tax rev-
enues. Because current Social Security bene-
fits are mainly determined by past wages,
higher current wage growth does not have a
similar impact on current Social Security
expenditures. However, growth in Social
Security benefits would eventually catch up
to wage growth as successive retiree cohorts—
with wage histories that include years after
the onset of faster wage growth—enter the
ranks of Social Security beneficiaries.
The lag between the impact of faster wage
growth on payroll taxes versus benefit outlays
that causes many people to believe that the
recent faster trend in productivity and wage
growth could “bail out” the Social Security
program from its financial problems. That
would obviate the need for politically unpalat-
able increases in payroll taxes or reductions in
scheduled Social Security benefits. This is par-
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ticularly convenient for those politically
opposed to both types of changes in Social
Security laws. They argue that if future real-
ized productivity growth is faster than the
postwar historical average through 1995
(about 2.1 percent per year), current estimates
of Social Security’s prospective financial
shortfalls are overstated. In addition, official
estimates of the program’s shortfall are based
on much smaller estimates of future produc-
tivity and wage growth. Under the Social
Security trustees’ intermediate, U.S. labor pro-
ductivity is assumed to grow at just 1.7 per-
cent—almost a full percentage point less than
the average rate of growth since 1996. That
means the official estimate of the program’s
future financial shortfall is overstated.4
A Brookings Institution study by North-
western University professor of economics
Robert J. Gordon suggests that the Social
Security Administration’s intermediate pro-
ductivity growth estimate is appallingly low—
at best only one-half as large as Professor
Gordon’s own estimate for the next 20 years
(beginning in 2003).5 Brookings Institution
economists Barry Bosworth and Jack Triplett
provide another study supporting the asser-
tion that productivity growth is on a perma-
nently faster trajectory. These two economists
predict that “Baumol’s disease”—the tendency
of productivity growth to slow as the service
sector, which has fewer productivity-growth
opportunities, increases its share in total eco-
nomic activity—has been cured permanently.6
If this claim is true, it implies that recent, more
rapid increases in labor productivity may be
sustained for a long time to come. These stud-
ies may have provided the intellectual support
for Senator John Kerry’s assertion during the
2004 presidential election debates that we
could “grow our way out” of Social Security’s
financial problems.7
The Conventional View
The conventional view that faster wage
growth improves Social Security’s finances
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Output and Compensation Per Hour: U.S. Non-Farm Business (Annual Percent Change)
Source: Calculated using data from the U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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has arisen for two reasons: First, one stan-
dard measure of Social Security’s financial
imbalance truncates the program’s financial
projections at 75 years from the current year.
That means worker-payroll taxes during the
next 75 years are counted but Social Security
obligations payable to them after the 75th
year are not counted when calculating the
program’s financial condition. Faster wage
growth would increase both taxes during the
next 75 years and benefit obligations to re-
tirees after the 75th year. However, the latter
would be ignored in the calculation, making
the program’s finances appear unambigu-
ously better. 
Second, the same conclusion emerges
under other standard measures of Social
Security’s solvency. For example, if we use the
“trust fund exhaustion date”—which current
estimates peg at 2042—as a metric of the pro-
gram’s financial condition, faster wage growth
would move this date further into the future
by a few years—again because higher growth
would increase tax payments by more than
benefit expenditures during the next few
decades leading to a larger trust-fund accu-
mulation through 2042 and moving the trust
fund exhaustion date further out into the
future. If we use the “crossover date”—when
Social Security payroll taxes begin to fall short
of benefit outlays (currently 2017)—that date
also shifts to a later one under a faster wage-
growth assumption.
Calculations of the annual balance ratio
perhaps provide the strongest case for the
conventional view. That’s because faster wage
growth increases annual balance ratios in all
future periods: Revenues increase immedi-
ately but benefits increase only with a time
lag. Hence, in general, faster wage growth
reduces today’s “income rate” (the ratio of
tax revenues to total payrolls) but not today’s
“cost rate” (the ratio of benefit expenditures
to total payrolls) because today’s benefits
depend on past wages that are fixed. But
there’s a surprising twist even here: Despite
the fact that annual balance ratios are
reduced throughout the future, it does not
follow that Social Security’s finances are
unambiguously improved. As argued below,
increased annual balance ratios in response
to faster wage growth is only one of two ele-
ments that must be taken into account when
judging whether Social Security’s finances
improve with faster wage growth.
All of this raises the question: Would Social
Security’s financial condition improve if it
were measured comprehensively—that is, by
counting all future taxes and benefits under
current Social Security rules, including those
falling outside the 75-year (or any other) “bud-
get window”? 
Logically, avoiding the imposition of a
“budget window” requires making financial
imbalance calculations through perpetuity.
However, $1 available this year is not identical
in value to $1 available 10, 20, or 50 . . . etc. years
hence. That’s because today’s dollar could be
invested at a safe market interest rate to gener-
ate more than $1 a few years hence. Placing all
(current and future) dollars on a level playing
field requires discounting future dollars for
expected inflation and real interest costs.
Hence, the proper metric for comprehensively
measuring Social Security’s prospective finan-
cial condition—the infinite horizon actuarial
imbalance measure—uses standard present-
value discounting of Social Security’s future
(taxable) payrolls, revenues, and expenditures.8
The Impact of Wage Growth
on Social Security’s Fiscal
Imbalance
Social Security’s infinite-horizon actuarial
balance (ABh) ratio is the difference between
the present discounted values of its projected
tax revenues and expenditures divided by the
present discounted value of future payrolls.
Thus, 
ABh. = PV_revenues — PV_expenditures (1)
PV_payrolls 
In equation (1), all present values (as of 2007)
of taxes, benefits, and payrolls are calculated
through perpetuity. ABh indicates how large
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the present value of Social Security’s future
financial surpluses are relative to the present
value of its future payroll base.9 The most
recent (2007) estimate of the Social Security
trustees indicates that this ratio equals –4.0
percent.10
The ABh measure is just that—a measure
of how large Social Security’s future short-
falls are relative to its payroll base. Some
observers interpret it as showing the addi-
tional rate of tax that must be imposed
immediately and permanently to cover Social
Security’s future shortfalls, but that policy
approach may be neither desirable nor neces-
sarily feasible—in the sense that any current
excess of taxes over benefits that emerges is
unlikely to be effectively saved, invested, and
devoted to funding Social Security under the
system’s current institutions. Alternative
policies—such as announcing future reduc-
tions in scheduled benefits—may be better,
more credible, and more desirable.
To begin the analysis of how ABhresponds
to faster wage growth, I make several assump-
tions: (a) that Social Security’s claims on the
U.S. treasury via its trust fund can be ignored;11
(b) that the population’s age structure is
fixed—that is, the ratio of retirees to workers
remains constant through time, (c) that current
retiree benefits are based on the current wage
level of workers, and (d) that the total popula-
tion is fixed. I call this “Case 1.” Assumptions
(b), (c), and (d) of Case 1 are obviously unreal-
istic, but examining what happens under them
leads to insights useful for understanding the
impact of faster wage growth under more real-
istic assumptions, as discussed below. 
Under assumptions (a)-(d), faster wage
growth would trigger proportional increases in
the present values of future (1) payrolls, (2)
payroll taxes and (3) Social Security benefits.12
Therefore, ABh would remain unchanged
despite faster wage growth. In other words,
ABh is neutral to wage growth under Case 1. 
Now modify Case 1 slightly by relaxing
assumption (b). Let the ratio of workers to
retirees decline over time. This change brings
the case a step closer to reality because the
worker-to-retiree ratio is, indeed, projected to
decline in the United States during the next
two decades—from about three workers per
retiree today to about two workers per retiree
by 2030. This change in the U.S. worker-to-
retiree ratio is built into the population’s
structure and is unavoidable. The retirement
of 76 million baby-boomers beginning in
2008 will simultaneously deplete the ranks of
workers and swell those of retirees. In this
case (“Case 2”), assumptions (c) and (d) are
maintained. That is, current Social Security
benefits are still based on workers’ current
wages and the total population is assumed
fixed in all future years. A decline in the ratio
of workers to retirees is accomplished in this
stylized case by assuming that nobody dies
and nobody is born and that workers gradu-
ally enter retirement as they become older.
What would happen to ABh under Case 2
if wage growth accelerated? The answer, clearly,
is that it would become larger. If wage growth
increases permanently beginning in 2007,
PV_expenditures will grow more than in propor-
tion to PV_revenues. That’s because the former
now grows for two reasons: faster wage growth
and a growing pool of retirees. Moreover, both
PV_revenues and PV_payrolls grow less than pro-
portionally with wage growth because worker
ranks are depleting. Hence the numerator
becomes a larger negative number and the
denominator becomes smaller under Case 2
(whereas under Case 1 all three—PV_expendi-
tures, PV_revenues, and PV_payrolls—increase
proportionally in response to faster wage
growth). Thus, the introduction of population
aging—a decline in the worker-to-retiree ratio—
worsens Social Security’s actuarial imbalance
ratio by making it a larger negative number. 
Now for “Case 3” where assumptions (a),
(b), and (d) are maintained as under Case 1, but
assumption (c) is relaxed. Specifically, Social
Security benefits in each period are based on
past rather than current wages. Again, this cor-
responds more closely to reality compared to
Case 1. Under U.S. Social Security’s benefit for-
mula, a worker’s retirement (and other) bene-
fits are based on his or her wage history—
counting the 35 highest years of past earnings
indexed for past wage growth. 
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How much each past year’s wage growth
influences total benefit expenditures in a
given year depends on the age structure of
the retiree population in that year. The older
they are on average, the greater is the influ-
ence of wage growth from the distant past in
determining total benefits, and the smaller is
the influence of wage growth in the near
past. Hence, the older retirees are, on average,
the slower will an acceleration in wage
growth beginning today become incorporat-
ed in future growth of annual benefit expen-
ditures. Thus, faster wage growth under Case
3 would increase PV_payrolls and PV_revenues
proportionally (as under Case 1) but
PV_expenditures will increase less than pro-
portionally because of the lagged impact of
faster growth on benefits. Thus, ABhwould
increase and Social Security’s finances would
improve under Case 3 in response to faster
wage growth. 
Bottom line question: What happens to
ABh in the case where both assumptions (b)
and (c) are relaxed? The answer depends on
whether the effect of relaxing assumption
(b)—which tends to worsen ABh in response
to faster wage growth—dominates the effect of
relaxing assumption (c)—which tends to im-
prove ABh in response to faster wage growth.
Which effect actually dominates depends on
the parameters that determine the conditions
under which the Social Security program
operates. Those parameters include the cur-
rent wage growth rate; the amount by which
wage growth accelerates beginning from
today; the rate of population aging; and the
degree to which wages in the distant past
influence each year’s benefits relative to those
in the near past. 
The next section shows calculations of the
impact of faster wage growth on ABh under
conditions specific to the United States. The
parameters enumerated above are deter-
mined from current U.S. demographic con-
ditions and projections provided by the
Social Security Administration. The calcula-
tions are implemented for the most realistic
case where all assumptions (a) through (d)
are relaxed. That is, Social Security’s existing
trust fund is taken into account (the cost on
the rest of the federal budget for repaying its
liabilities to Social Security are ignored); pop-
ulation aging is allowed to proceed as pro-
jected for the United States; each year’s bene-
fit expenditures depend on past wages and
the degree of dependence is calibrated to the
age structure of retirees; and the total size of
the population is allowed to increase as con-
sistent with projected (positive) fertility, mor-
tality, and immigration rates. 
Wage Growth and Social
Security’s Imbalance:
Measurement for the
United States
In the simple example developed here, the
economy is assumed to have N0 workers in
period 0. Each worker earns W0 in wages and
total payrolls in period 0 is given by P0=N0 x
W0. If the payroll tax rate equals t, total rev-
enues in period 0 are R0=N0 x W0 x t.
13
The worker-to-retiree ratio in period 0 is
denoted by b0. Hence, there are N0/b0 retirees
in period 0. If each retiree receives benefits
based on current wages (as under assumption
[b] above), and the replacement rate (the
ratio of retirement benefits to pre-retirement
wages) equals r, each retiree’s annual benefit
equals W0 x r and total benefits B0 are given
by B0 = (N0/b0) x W0 x r. 
The time series of payrolls, P0, P1, . . . etc.,
payroll tax revenues, R1, R2, . . . etc., and total
benefit expenditures B0, B1, . . . etc., can be dis-
counted using the government’s interest rate
(assumed to be 3 percent) to form ABh as in
Equation 1. To obtain these three series, how-
ever, we need to calibrate the rates of growth of
the worker population, wages, and the rate of
decline in the worker-to-beneficiary popula-
tion. The other items, namely the tax rate t,
and the benefit replacement rate, r, are set
according to current Social Security policies.
The payroll tax rate is assumed to be 10.6 per-
cent (for the Old Age and Survivors Insurance
part of Social Security), and the replacement
7
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rate is assumed to be constant near its current
average rate of 41.5 percent. The initial work-
er-to-beneficiary ratio, b0, is set to 3.3—its cur-
rent value in the United States. 
Calibration of ABh to growth in the U.S.
population and its age-structure is based on
annual age-specific population projections
provided by the Social Security Administra-
tion. Figure 2 shows that the projected work-
er-to-beneficiary ratio in the United States
(those covered by Social Security under cur-
rent laws) will decline from 3.3 workers per
retiree today to just 2 workers by 2050. And
that ratio is projected to continue declining
during the remainder of this century. The
most rapid decline occurs during the next 20-
year period (through about 2025) as the baby-
boomers transition into retirement. During
this phase, the rate of decline in the worker-to-
beneficiary ratio climbs from zero today to
about 3 percent per year. It returns to low lev-
els by about 2035, but remains positive there-
after (that is the worker-to-beneficiary ratio
continues to decline).
The decline in the worker-to-beneficiary
ratio is projected to occur even as the total
population grows larger. Figure 3 shows the
worker and worker-plus-retiree populations as
projected by the Social Security Administra-
tion. Both population series are normalized to
their respective population sizes in 2005. The
figure indicates that a projected decline in the
worker-to-beneficiary ratio does not involve a
stagnant total population as assumed under
Case 1 earlier. Rather, both populations are
projected to grow in absolute size in the
United States. A declining worker-to-benefi-
ciary ratio just means that the fraction of the
total (and growing) population that would be
in the workforce is expected to decline over the
next 75 years. 
The calculations of ABh reported below
are based on a growing worker population
and a declining worker-to-beneficiary popula-
tion consistent with the conditions projected
for the United States. The rate of decline in
the worker-to-beneficiary ratio beyond the
terminal year of the Social Security Admini-
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2007). 
stration’s projections (2080) is assumed to
remain constant at its terminal year value. 
The final step in the calibration of ABh is
the weighting of past wages in the benefit cal-
culation that is involved in relaxing assump-
tion (c). An equal weighting of past wages in
calculating ABh would be inappropriate
because mortality reduces the sizes of older
cohorts whose benefits are determined by
wages further back in the past. Hence, ABh
should be calculated using declining weights
calibrated to the age distribution of retiree
cohort sizes over time. Applying smaller rather
than equal weights to wage levels further back
in the past implies that the impact of relaxing
assumption (c) (whereby ABh improves in
response to faster wage growth) diminishes
relative to the effect of relaxing assumption (b)
(whereby ABh worsens with faster wage
growth). Under declining weights on wages
further back in the past, a larger share of total
benefits would be paid to relatively younger
retirees and faster wage growth would increase
benefit expenditures more quickly. 
This extensive calibration exercise allows
an examination of the effect of faster wage
growth on ABh under demographic condi-
tions relevant for the United States. Table 1
shows two types of actuarial balance calcula-
tions—ABh and AB75—in order to compare
the implications of both. The calculations are
presented for alternative discount rates as
well, to see if the conclusion would be sensi-
tive to the choice of the discount rate (it is
not).
What message does Table 1 convey? Panel
B shows the baseline case under a 3.0 percent
discount rate. It shows that increasing the
wage growth assumption from 1.1 percent
per year to 1.6 percent per year (these are the
Social Security Administration’s intermedi-
ate- and low-cost real wage growth rates
respectively) increases (improves) AB75 from
–1.5 percent to –1.1 percent. However, ABh
decreases (worsens) from -3.2 percent to –4.1
percent under the same change in the wage
growth rate. As confirmed by Panels A and C
of Table 1, the directions of change in ABh
and AB75 in response to faster wage growth
remain opposed to each other despite chang-
ing the discount rate: ABh exhibits a wors-
ening in Social Security’s finances for a range
9
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of discount rates whereas AB75 shows an
improvement. 
As described earlier, the rate of decline in
the worker-to-beneficiary ratio is a crucial para-
meter determining the behavior of ABh in
response to faster wage growth. Hence, in addi-
tion to exploring that behavior under alterna-
tive discount rates, it is also important to
explore it under different rates of decline in the
worker-to-beneficiary ratio. The above experi-
ments showed that ABh declines with faster
wage growth (Social Security’s finances wors-
en) under calibration to U.S. parameters. A key
point, however, is that faster wage growth fails
to improve Social Security’s financial condi-
tion under less stringent conditions.
The experiments implemented earlier
assumed that Social Security’s terminal (year-
75) rate of decline in the worker-to-beneficiary
ratio, b, remained in place forever. Although
gradually increasing longevity and a gradual
but continuing decline in fertility is not incon-
ceivable for a number of decades beyond the
next 75 years, the assumption of declining
worker-retiree ratios in perpetuity is difficult
to defend. What would happen to ABh if that
rate of decline were assumed to become zero—
and the worker-to-beneficiary ratio to remain
constant—after just a few years beyond the
75th year? 
To explore the impact, ABh is calculated
under alternative ranges of years beyond the
next 75 after which the decline in the worker-
to-beneficiary ratio is terminated. In other
words, it is assumed that the rate of decline in
the worker-to-beneficiary ratio equals that
shown in figure 2 through the 75th year; it
equals the year-75 value for N years after year
75, and it becomes zero after year 75+N. Table
2 shows changes in the infinite-term actuarial
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Table 1
Social Security’s Actuarial Balance Ratios under Selected Real Wage Growth and Discount
Rates
Discount Rate Projection Horizon Real Wage Growth
(percent) (years) Rate (percent) AB (percent)
Panel A
Panel B
Panel C
Source: Andrew Biggs and Jagadeesh Gokhale, “Wage Growth and the Measurement of Social Security’s Financial
Condition,” in Government Spending on the Elderly, ed. Dimitri B. Papadimitriou (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007).
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1.6
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-4.0
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3.0
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1.1
1.6
-1.5
-1.1
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-4.1
3.3
AB75
ABh
1.1
1.6
1.1
1.6
-1.3
-1.0
-2.7
-3.1
balance from increasing wage growth under
alternative values of N. It shows that the infi-
nite-term ABhunder wage growth of 1.6 per-
cent per year is smaller (worse) than that
under wage growth of 1.1 percent per year
when population aging is allowed to proceed
for just a little more than 20 years beyond the
next 75 (N=20 or more). Thus, although the
negative impact of higher wage growth on the
infinite-term actuarial balance requires the
assumption of a continued decline in the
worker-to-beneficiary ratio beyond the 75th
year, it suffices to maintain that assumption
for only a little more than 20 years beyond that
conventional projection horizon.
Contrasting Annual-Balance
Ratios with ΑΒh: 
A Paradox?
As mentioned in the introduction, one of
the measures emphasized by the Social
Security Trustees is the sequence of annual
cash-balance ratios—each year’s ratio equals the
difference between the income ratio (ratio of tax
revenues to payrolls in that year) and the cost
ratio (the ratio of benefits to payrolls in that
year).14 As it turns out, annual balance ratios
perhaps provide the strongest support for the
conventional view. Unlike the other measures
of Social Security’s finances, annual balance
ratios are not subject to the short-term bias
criticism because they can in principle be cal-
culated for all future years. Faster real-wage
growth increases (makes less negative) annual
cash-balance ratios—that is, it reduces each
years cost ratio relative to the same year’s in-
come ratio—in perpetuity. For many observers,
this fact reinforces the conventional view that
faster wage growth improves Social Security’s
financial condition.
Thus, a seeming paradox arises when one
compares the impact of faster wage growth
on Social Security’s financial condition in
terms of annual balance ratios with that mea-
sured using ABh. As shown earlier, measure-
ment of Social Security’s finances using ABh
under U.S. demographic and wage growth
parameters indicates that faster wage growth
worsens the program’s financial condition.
However, as stated in previous paragraphs, it
is also true that under those same conditions,
annual balance ratios would be larger (less
negative) under faster wage growth in all
future years. How can the conflicting signals
from these two indicators be reconciled? 
Faster wage growth increases each year’s
income ratio in about the same proportion but
not that year’s cost ratio because benefits depend
on wage growth in earlier periods. Figure 4
shows the change in future annual balance
ratios in response to increasing wage growth
from 1.1 percent per year to 1.6 percent per
year. This case corresponds to the one of Panel
B of Table 1. The thick line shows annual bal-
ance ratios under a lower rate of annual wage
growth (1.1 percent), and the thin line shows
those ratios under a faster rate of annual wage
growth rate per year (1.6 percent). 
Each year’s annual balance ratio (multi-
plied by –1) reflects the share of payrolls that
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Table 2
Infinite Term Actuarial Balance under Alternative Horizons For Decline in the
Worker-to-Beneficiary Ratio
N ABh Under Alternative Wage Growth Rate Assumptions
(Number of years after the next 75) 1.1 percent 1.6 percent
10 -2.51 -2.47
20 -2.61 -2.61
30 -2.70 -2.74
Source: Andrew Biggs and Jagadeesh Gokhale, “Wage Growth and the Measurement of Social Security’s Financial
Condition,” in Government Spending on the Elderly, ed. Dimitri B. Papadimitriou (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). 
would have to be additionally devoted (either by
way of a cut in benefits or increase in taxes)
toward closing the gap between the program’s
revenues and expenditures in that year. Figure
4 shows that the amount would be negative
during the first few years because Social
Security taxes are currently in surplus.15 Note
that today’s Social Security expenditures are
predetermined based on past wage outcomes,
but today’s Social Security revenues depend
on current payrolls. If wages were to grow
faster starting today, today’s revenues would
increase by a lot because the entire work force’s
payrolls would now be larger and would gen-
erate more taxes immediately. However, bene-
fits would increase only after another year, and
then only because the benefits of those retir-
ing in that year would increase on account of
the previous year’s faster wage growth. It
would take many years before today’s faster
wage growth became fully incorporated in
proportionally higher benefit payments. But
again, during the intervening years, revenue
increases would continue to accrue as faster
wage growth (that commenced this year) is
sustained in future years. It is not surprising,
then, that the gap between revenues and bene-
fits (the annual balance ratio) would become
larger in all future years. This explains why the
annual balance ratio curve under wage growth
of 1.6 percent per year lies above that under 1.1
percent wage growth in all future years
(although Figure 4 shows the shift only for the
first 100 years). 
Most observers stop the analysis at this
point and conclude that Social Security’s
finances are improved as a result of faster wage
growth. As it turns out, however, this is only a
part of the story. Notice that the increase in
annual balance ratios in all future years as
shown in Figure 4 is consistent with the result
of the earlier section. That is, ABh is smaller—
is a larger negative percentage—under the
faster annual wage growth rate of 1.6 percent
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compared to 1.1 percent. That provides a hint
that the previous paragraph’s analysis is not
complete and that drawing the conventional
conclusion is not yet warranted. 
The values of ABh under Table 1’s two
rates of wage growth are shown in Figure 4:
“Line A” refers to the ABh rate of –3.2 per-
cent corresponding to a 1.1 percent wage
growth rate, and “Line B” refers to the ABh
rate of –4.1 percent under a 1.6 percent wage
growth rate. Both ABh levels are taken from
Panel B of Table 2—under a discount rate of
3.0 percent. 
To reiterate, the paradox is that the ABh
measure suggests that faster wage growth
worsens Social Security’s finances. That is, a
larger negative value of ABhunder faster wage
growth implies that the share of payrolls that
must immediately and permanently be devot-
ed to make the system sustainable is larger.
However, the sequence of annual balance ratios
suggests that the system’s finances are im-
proved because those ratios are larger in all
future years—that is, annual balance ratios are
either larger positive numbers during years of
surplus revenues or smaller negative numbers
during years of deficits as shown in Figure 4.
The contradictory conclusions from the
two measures are reconciled, however, when
one realizes that the ABh is simply a weighted
average of annual balance ratios where the aver-
age is computed over all future years. If a tax
increase equal to (the negative of) this aver-
age ratio were levied on all future payrolls
and the additional funds were devoted to
Social Security, it would fully plug Social
Security’s financial gap. What are the weights
used in computing this average? The weight
applicable to each future year’s annual bal-
ance ratio is the share of that year’s payrolls
in total future payrolls.16
This prepares us for the second (and usual-
ly neglected) part of the analysis: Although
faster wage growth increases each future year’s
applicable cash-balance ratio (thus reducing
the pay-as-you-go tax increase required in each
future year to close each year’s shortfall), it
also increases the shares of annual payrolls (in
total future payrolls) that accrue in the distant
future relative to the shares of annual payrolls
in years closer to today. Note that Figure 4
shows that under U.S. conditions, the levels of
annual balance ratios under a given wage
growth rate declines (becomes more negative)
over time. In Figure 4, annual balance ratios
decline over time under each of the two
assumptions regarding the growth rate of
wages—1.1 percent growth and 1.6 percent
growth. Because under faster wage growth, the
payroll weights applicable to the (algebraically
smaller) annual balance ratios in distant
future years increase, the average annual bal-
ance ratio declines (becomes more negative)
notwithstanding the fact that annual balance
ratios themselves are larger (less negative) in
each future year under faster wage growth.
That this is the case under U.S. conditions
is shown by the fact that in Figure 4, the level
of ABh under 1.6 percent wage growth per
year lies below the level of ABh under wage
growth of 1.1 percent per year. Notice that
the former level corresponds to an annual
cash balance ratio further out into the future
(marked as Point B in Figure 4) because the
larger weighting by payrolls occurring in the
distant future pulls the “average point” in the
right-ward direction compared to that corre-
sponding to level of ABh under the lower
wage growth of 1.1 percent per year (Point A).
Policy Implications
This resolution of the paradox described
above can be understood in terms of alterna-
tive policy approaches to closing Social
Security’s shortfall. Under any given rate of
wage growth, a “pre-funding” policy would be
to apply the average actuarial-balance ratio
(ABh) to each future year’s payrolls. From the
results above, the required average tax increase
would be larger under faster wage growth
(ABh is a larger negative number under faster
wage growth as shown in Table 1 and Figure
4). On the other hand, a “pay-as-you-go” poli-
cy would levy each future year’s annual bal-
ance ratio (as shown by the curves in Figure 4)
as a tax increase on that year’s payrolls.17
Indeed, in the first few years of payroll-tax sur-
pluses, it would involve a tax reduction. Figure
4 also shows that the pay-as-you-go tax
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increases would grow larger over time under
both wage-growth assumptions (both the thin
and thick curves in Figure 4 decrease over
time). However, in every future year (extending
in perpetuity), the applicable pay-as-you-go
tax increase would be smaller under the faster
wage growth rate (the thin annual balance
ratio line lies above the thick annual balance
ratio line in Figure 4). 
Adopting the pay-as-you-go approach to
closing future Social Security shortfalls is sup-
ported by the conventional view, which sug-
gests that faster wage growth improves Social
Security’s financial condition. One could
reverse this argument to claim that those who
appear to principally support the pay-as-you-
go policy approach to fixing Social Security’s
financial problems tend to emphasize annual
balance ratios as their preferred measure of the
program’s financial condition. The conven-
tional view based on annual balance ratios,
however, is an illusion created by ignoring the
fact that a larger share of total future payrolls
would be subjected to higher future tax in-
creases under the pay-as-you-go policy com-
pared to the pre-funding policy.18
The ABhmeasure shows that adopting the
pay-as-you-go policy is equivalent to imposing
a larger tax rate, on average, on all future pay-
rolls when the comparison is based on an eval-
uation of the fiscal treatment under Social
Security of all future payrolls (in present value
terms). In the U.S. case, that larger tax results
from the particular configuration of the exist-
ing population age-structure, prospective pop-
ulation aging, and the range of relevant wage
growth rates. 
Conclusion
The impact of faster wage growth on Social
Security finances is theoretically ambiguous.
Under calibrations consistent with U.S. demo-
graphic and economic conditions, however,
faster wage growth worsens Social Security’s
financial condition when it is measured com-
prehensively. This result contradicts that
obtained under traditional measures of Social
Security’s financial status—such as annual bal-
ance ratios, truncated actuarial deficits, cross-
over dates, and trust fund–exhaustion dates. 
The perpetuity measure of ABh employ-
ed here is generally de-emphasized by Social
Security’s trustees, but it constitutes a more
comprehensive and financially more sensible
measure of the program’s finances. Indeed,
the Social Security trustees give prominence
only to measures with a short-term bias, all of
which have promoted the now-conventional
view that faster wage growth would improve
Social Security’s financial condition. This
mistaken conclusion appears to be driving
the public debate on Social Security reform
and appears to provide ammunition for a “do
nothing” policy. 
The conventional view is incorrect—at
least in the U.S. case. Adopting a “do nothing”
policy because we expect future wage growth
to be faster than that assumed by the Social
Security trustees in their financial projections
would be precisely wrong and opposite rela-
tive to the policy prescription suggested
under a more comprehensive, long-term mea-
sure—the infinite-horizon actuarial balance—
ABh.
Some readers may wonder if the result that
faster wage growth worsens Social Security’s
financial condition implies another perverse
policy prescription: to reduce future productiv-
ity and wage growth via, say, higher taxes. How-
ever, the analysis here only to evaluates whether
faster wage growth would improve or worsen
Social Security’s financial condition under the
program’s current rules of operation. Even if
Social Security’s finances are worsened under
faster wage growth, the latter remains desirable
because it would provide more resources to
allocate to the population’s needs. 
Conservative commentators sometimes use
the conventional view—that faster wage growth
would improve Social Security’s finances—to
argue against tax increases because those would
also worsen Social Security’s finances. The
demonstration that the conventional view is
incorrect under the ABh metric means that
conservatives’ arguments against tax increases
stand or fall according to their impact on eco-
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nomic growth. The further impact on Social
Security’s finances should not be adduced to
support the case against tax hikes.
Lastly, there is the issue of choosing
between annual balance ratios and ABh as a
metric for basing judgment about the impact
of faster wage growth. Many commentators
vested in the “do nothing” policy would likely
reject ABh in favor of annual cash balances. If
the seriousness of Social Security’s financial
condition is judged by the additional share of
future payrolls that must be devoted to cover
the gap between its revenues and outlays, that
share is clearly larger on average under faster
wage growth. As such, adopting a pay-as-you-
go approach because of faster expected wage
growth is inconsistent with fiscal conser-
vatism that seeks to reduce the overall size
and influence of the government on people’s
economic lives throughout the future.19 This
perspective is communicated more clearly
through the ABhmeasure under a fuller and
financially proper accounting of the implica-
tions of faster wage growth for the program’s
financial condition.
Notes
This paper draws from “Wage Growth and the
Measurement of Social Security’s Financial Con-
dition,” by Andrew Biggs and Jagadeesh Gokhale, in
Government Spending on the Elderly, ed. Dimitri B. Papa-
dimitriou (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). 
1.  The liberal position is well known. For the con-
servative position, see “Don’t Know Much About
History . . . ” Wall Street Journal, June 12, 2006, p.
A12. 
2.  Technically, annual balance ratios could be cal-
culated for all future years, but it is impractical to
show how those ratios evolve in perpetuity. The
standard practice is to calculate them through the
next 75 years. 
3.  The two series of output per hour and compen-
sation per hour shown in Figure 1 have a correla-
tion coefficient of 0.52 for the entire time period
1948–2006. For the three separate periods of
1948–73, 1974–95 and 1996–2006, the correlation
coefficients are also positive: 0.19, 0.59, and 0.41
respectively.
4.  For a contrary view, see Charles P. Balhous III,
“Have the Social Security Trustees Been Too Con-
servative?” Presentation to the American Enterprise
Institute, September 7, 2007.
5.  See Robert J. Gordon, “Exploding Productivity
Growth: Context, Causes, and Implications,” Brook-
ings Papers on Economic Activity, No. 2, 2003, pp. 207–
98, http://faculty-web.at.northwestern.edu/economi
cs/gordon/Productivity-Brookings.pdf. 
6.  See Jack E. Triplett and Barry P. Bosworth,
“Productivity Measurement Issues in Service Indus-
tries: “Baumol’s Disease” Has Been Cured,” Federal
Reserve Bank of New York, Economic Policy Review 9,
no. 3 (September 2003): 23–33.
7.  For example, see the description of Senator
Kerry’s position on Social Security, http://www.
centristpolicynetwork.org/archives/000071.html. 
8.  Social Security’s financial condition under the
alternative measure of the annual cash-balance
ratio—that is, the difference between annual rev-
enues and expenditures taken as a share of the
same year’s payrolls—is discussed later in the text.
9.  One could simply measure the size of Social
Security’s shortfall in terms of present-value dol-
lars. However, that does not tell us whether a
change in the shortfall in response to faster wage
growth would increase compared to our capacity
to cover it. Taking the present-value shortfall as a
share of the present-value of future payrolls or
GDP enables such a comparison. If this share
increases with faster wage growth, it means that a
larger fraction of future payrolls (or GDP) would
have to be devoted to covering the shortfall. 
10. See the 2007 annual report of the Social Security
trustees, chapter IV.B.5. Total unfunded obligations
(not including the program’s trust fund) equal
$15.6 trillion and the present value of future pay-
rolls is estimate to be $388.4 trillion. The ratio of
those two numbers equals 4.0 percent. 
11. The value of Social Security’s trust-fund secu-
rities ($2.0 trillion) is relatively small compared to
the present value of its financial shortfall ($15.6
trillion). Moreover, paying off the trust fund’s
securities requires increasing other federal (non-
Social Security) revenues and/or imposing cuts in
other federal spending.
12. If both terms in the numerator of equation (1)
grow by x percent, their difference would also grow
by x percent. Since the denominator also grows by
x percent, the ratio would remain unchanged.
13. Revenues from taxing benefits are ignored as
they constitute a very small share of total Social
15
Security revenues—just 3 percent in 2007 for the
Old Age and Survivors Insurance program. 
14. For example, the current (2007) ratio of Social
Security’s taxes to payrolls (the income ratio)
equals 0.128, or 12.8 percent, and the current ratio
of benefit expenditures to payrolls equals 0.112 or
11.2 percent. That makes the 2007 annual balance
ratio 0.128-0.112=0.016 or 1.6 percent. See single
year data on income and cost rates in the 2007
annual report of the Social Security trustees avail-
able at: http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/TR/TR07/lr4B
1.html#foot1. 
15. The annual balance ratios shown in Figure 4 do
not match official estimates of the “crossover date”
because the model does not include auxiliary bene-
fits such as spousal, survivor, mother/father, di-
vorcee, and children’s dependent and survivor ben-
efits. These exclusions are responsible for crossover
dates much further out in time in Figure 4 com-
pared to official measures. However, including such
auxiliary benefits is unlikely to overturn the results
of this paper because all such benefits are deter-
mined based on the primary worker’s wage history.
They would not eliminate the conflict described
above, namely, the different conclusions regarding
the system’s financial condition under annual cash-
balance ratios versus the infinite horizon actuarial
balance measure. 
16. Technically, the future payrolls in the numer-
ator and total of all payrolls in the denominator—
that are used for computing each year’s share (to
be used as the weight for that year’s annual bal-
ance ratio in computing the average)—are both in
terms of present discounted values. Note that the
sum of such annual weights in perpetuity would
add up to one as required in calculating the aver-
age annual balance ratio over all future years.
17. As mentioned in the introduction, neither of
these two tax-increase policy approaches should
be considered to be approaches that this paper
recommends. The description is used here only
for clarifying the difference in the two measures
of Social Security’s financial condition.
18. Some observers suggest that adopting a pay-as-
you-go approach and imposing higher surtaxes on
future cohorts is justified because they will be more
productive and richer than today’s population.
However, imposing ever-higher tax rates (and not
just on account of Social Security, but also to make
other entitlements such as Medicare and Medicaid
financially sustainable) may reduce future genera-
tions’ incentives to work and save as much—which
potentially overturns the prior assumption about
rising prosperity of future generations. 
19. The perspective that Social Security enables bet-
ter risk sharing with future generations argues for
allowing the government to help reduce earnings
risks across all generations. That asserts a positive
role for government intervention in achieving retire-
ment security for citizens. The benefits from such
risk sharing, however, could potentially be offset by
welfare losses from lower saving and capital crowd-
ing out—as suggested by Dirk Krueger and Felix
Kubler in “Pareto-Improving Social Security Reform
when Financial Markets are Incomplete,” American
Economic Review 96, no. 3 (June 2006): 737–55.
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